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Abstract— Several pilot tests show that patients who are able 
to access their Electronic Health Records (EHR), become more 
responsible and involved in the maintenance of their health. 
However, despite technologically feasible and legally possible, 
there is no validated or standardized toolset available yet, for 
patients to review and manage their EHR. Many privacy, 
security and usability issues must be solved first before this 
practice can be made mainstream. This paper proposes and 
discusses the design of an access control visual application that 
addresses most of these issues, and offers patients a secure, 
controlled and easy access to their EHR. 
Keywords— Visual access control; electronic health records; 
patient empowerment; security and usability. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Both the European Recommendation and American 
Legislation for the protection of medical data agree that 
patients should be allowed to access personal medical records 
and take decisions regarding their content and distribution 
[1][2]. Some European countries implement those directives 
even more openly. The Portuguese legislation, for instance, 
allows patients to access their medical data without 
intermediaries [3]: it considers patients the legal owners of 
their data whereas it regards healthcare institutions the 
responsible guardians of the patient data that they produce and 
store.  
If those directives were implemented today, patients would 
be ready to take more interest and control over their medical 
data [4]. Accustomed to a widespread communication 
technology, most of them are already seeking out in the 
Internet information about their pathologies, driven by 
curiosity to know more about their conditions and urged by 
the need to find ways to improve their treatments [5].  
On the other side, healthcare professionals and health 
institutions are already organizing medical data in Electronic 
Health Records (EHR). EHR, which can be shared over 
different institutions, keep track of the medical history of 
patients, together with medical exams, lab tests and 
demographics. Presently, excluding specific cases of research 
or of some experiments in defined medical specialities [6][7], 
patients have no means to regularly access their EHR. But 
several professionals agree that letting patients reviewing and 
commenting their EHR, for instance prior to a consultation, 
would be highly beneficial [8]. Recent studies show that 
patients who review their EHR are more informed, proactive 
and responsible over their healthcare treatments and are 
generally more satisfied with the outcomes of their therapies 
[6][9][10]. Such informed patients are expected to 
communicate better with doctors, to commit more faithfully to 
their rehabilitation, and be more inclined to follow medical 
recommendations [6][7]. These positive reactions are believed 
to ameliorate how professionals and organizations approach 
healthcare [11][12]. 
However, unless protected by adequate data access control 
mechanisms and policies, opening access to EHRs is risky. Its 
careless usage may seriously compromise data integrity and 
privacy [13][14]. At present, likely to avoid such a risk, there 
are no institution independent, dynamic (always updated) yet 
secure applications offering patients the possibility to review 
their integrated EHR collected from different institutions at 
any moment in time. However, the challenge of developing 
such an application is not only technological. Because it 
should work both for the medical professionals and for the 
uneducated laymen, that challenge is socio-technical [15]. A 
toolset accessing EHR should provide trustworthiness while 
offering user-friendly human computer interactions (HCI) that 
infuse users, particularly the non-experts, with an honest sense 
of trust. 
This paper proposes and discusses a preliminary design of 
a patient’s access control visual application called “Patient 
Access Control Visualization & Monitoring” (PACVIM), 
meant to provide patients with an easy but controlled access to 
their EHR, over the Internet. In this way, PACVIM educates 
patients to be prepared to follow their therapies and puts 
health informatics at the service of the society.  
Architecturally, PACVIM integrates with OFELIA (Open 
Federated Environments Leveraging Identity and 
Authorization), a prototype system to perform registration, 
authentication and authorisation to EHRs [16]. From the 
human interaction’s point of view, PACVIM uses visual 
access control tools commonly employed nowadays to browse 
social networks. It is designed to be easily understandable and 
usable by non-experts and integrates, where possible, touch 
gestures. PACVIM relies on future research in HCI security 
and usability (with both qualitative and quantitative methods) 
to face access control, usability and security requirements 
regarding different end-users’ communities.  
2 
 
The next section presents related work while section III 
describes an overview of OFELIA and its integration with 
PACVIM. Section IV describes PACVIM’s main 
requirements and features for a first stage of its design. 
Section V discusses PACVIM’s proposed design and suggests 
future work. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
There has been some interest in patient’s empowerment 
regarding his/her healthcare data, however, this has been hard 
to implement as well as integrate with existing EHRs and 
other healthcare institutions’ databases. Some sporadic 
applications have been proposed to help patients accessing and 
maintaining their medical records. These are called Personal 
Health Records (PHR). PHR are systems that allow patients to 
insert and access both demographic and medical data, often 
with the possibility to share information with healthcare 
professionals [17]. But PHRs are stand-alone patient-oriented 
systems, not meant to being integrated with existing EHRs. 
Likely, this means redundancy of data, potential 
inconsistencies and management problems. No integration 
means also that the records stored by patients are not ruled by 
the same policies that regulate, by law, how health institutions 
should handle medical information. Consequently, data 
privacy can seriously get out of any control. 
The lack of regulation and legislation about who owns and 
who is responsible for medical data is also a serious limitation 
of PHRs. Let us take for example “Google Health” [18]. This 
PHR was introduced by Google in 2008 but, because its 
adoption had been very sporadic and only among certain 
groups of users like the tech-savvy patients and their 
caregivers, it has been discontinued since 2011. Patients were 
invited to withdraw their (possibly sensitive) healthcare data, 
but from 2013 this is not possible anymore. Google claims that 
all data have been destroyed but patients cannot control that 
claim. They can only trust what Google tells them.  
In general, PHR’s security and privacy policies are not as 
clear as they should [19]. This lack of clarity, together with the 
fact that most PHRs run over the Internet and permit patients 
to share information with whomever they want, has the 
drawback to leave users unaware of who eventually can see 
those records and ignorant of the risk of losing control 
altogether over their data. The adoption of mobile technology 
makes this situation even frailer [20]. 
Regarding now the use of visual tools, this work [21] shows 
that users perform more accurate access control policy 
analysis with social network’s style visualization tools, than 
without them. Such a strategy may be of use in PACVIM, 
because it is difficult for a user to mentally keep track of the 
topology of his/her constantly changing healthcare EHR 
network. Other works propose visual languages for specifying 
role based access control rules for web systems [22], or 
describe visual approaches to manage access control for 
distributed research ecosystems based on a multi-purpose 
collaborative graph structure [23]. Individuals are enabled to 
visually interact with the graph and contribute to access 
control decisions by jointly modelling the environment’s 
structures and policies. The burden of project management can 
be eased with an integrated view of complex environments. 
The authors did not find similar research to the one 
proposed in this paper, in the healthcare domain, except for 
this recent study [24] whose main goal is to help doctors and 
medical staff to configure access control rules reliably and 
quickly. To do this, they introduce a human-centric, visual, 
and context-aware access control system for distributed 
clinical data management and health information systems. 
They also propose to extend the tool in the future to let 
patients participate in the access control process, to choose 
different levels of data privacy for their medical data and 
having security in their hands. But not many details were 
provided regarding this subject and, so far, there has not been 
a follow up of this work to a more practical research. 
III. OFELIA’S INTEGRATION WITH  PACVIM 
OFELIA (Open Federated Environments Leveraging 
Identity and Authorization) [16]  is an identity management 
framework that entrusts patients with the possibility to exert 
some control over personal medical data by allowing them to 
register to an existing EHR, and be authorized to access the 
data therein maintained, according to the policies of the 
healthcare institution that runs that EHR. 
The framework consists of a set of services including: an 
XMPP (Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol) server 
to establish communication with a mobile device, an external 
web application that provides a graphical interface for patients 
in order to reply to requests from external computers (e.g., 
patient’s computer), an internal management service to allow 
patients’ initial registration and to  establish communication 
between the health institution’s EHR database, an external 
web application and the OFELIA client - a mobile application 
used to provide a strong authentication by granting 
discretionary access rights to the requested EHR [25]. The 
OFELIA client offers patients the following functionalities:  
registration, authentication and authorisation.  
Patient’s registration: allows a patient to register to an 
existing EHR hosted by a healthcare institution. Fig. 1 
presents the six steps to establish a secure patient’s 
registration: (step 1) the patient authenticates to the health 
institution’s computer using his/her electronic citizen card or 
electronic health institution card; (step 2) a pair of  Quick 
Response (QR) codes [26] is retrieved by the health 
institution’s computer, where they can be read with the 
patient’s mobile device.  




When the first QR code is read, it installs in the patient’s 
device the OFELIA client with the necessary services to 
proceed with the registration. The second QR code uses 
OFELIA Client to complete the registration process described 
in steps 3 to 6 where the patient’s device and the healthcare 
institution’s registration computer establish a secure session, 
which relies on PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) certificates, 
including digital signatures and one time passwords (OTP). 
More details in [16]. 
Patient’s authentication and authorization: handles the 
necessary steps that allow the patient to securely access his/her 
EHR from a registered health institution. This functionality is 
responsible for the process schematised in Fig. 2.  
Users can request access to an EHR from any network 
running the OFELIA web service. They connect to the 
OFELIA external web application, which replies with a QR 
code that encodes a session key. This key needs to be 
activated by the patient before being validly used to access the 
EHR. The patient reads the QR code session key with the 
OFELIA client (by using his/her mobile device), which 
electronic signs the  session key with the patient’s PGP 
certificate, and sends it back, via the XMPP server, to the 
OFELIA external web application. This application validates 
the electronic signature and authenticates the patient. It links 
him/her to the QR code session key, and automatically 
refreshes the external web application interface with the 
patient’s information containing the list of roles/access control 
permissions. After this authentication process, the patient is 
authorized to securely access his/her medical records. 
Gathering these records and enforcing the security of the 
accesses is handled by OFELIA’s web service running at each 
institution’s site. Such background activities are completely 
transparent to the patients. 
A patient that has registered to an EHR is likely to go 
browsing the content of that EHR. This task may not be 
straightforward, since patients may not be familiar with access 
control models or even EHR content. They need a user-
friendly interface to visualize, in a comprehensive manner, the 
rights that each role has upon the records and what 
information is inside each record. PACVIM adds exactly such 
a visual interface to OFELIA’s secure infrastructure. Patients 
can therefore transparently see all the connections and parts of 
EHR that are shared among different healthcare institutions 
(more on section IV.B). 
OFELIA’s client has been prototyped on android-based 
devices and tested for usability, especially its use of QR codes 
in the registration process [27]. The prototype has been judged 
positively by the participants for its good appearance, 
information content and usability. Fig. 3 shows two 
screenshots of this application. 
 
Fig. 4 shows how OFELIA integrates with PACVIM and 
how a patient interacts with the visual interface. The part in 
the bottom shows the registration with the OFELIA web 
service. On the top right is the visual interface showing an 
access control network (section IV.B) that the patient sees 
when browsing the EHR. Here, OFELIA client asks 
authorization to the OFELIA web service, awaits the data 
which the server gathers, and presents it on the patient’s 
screen. 
 




A. General Requirements 
As an application responsible for ruling a patient’s access 
and visualization to an EHR, PACVIM must satisfy specific 
Fig. 3 – Smartphone interface of OFELIA’s 
registration process using QR codes (prototype). 
Fig. 2 - OFELIA: Patient’s authentication and access.  
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requirements including: (a) healthcare standards, (b) access 
control models together with security directives and practices 
and (c) usability features. 
Healthcare standards: several healthcare standards 
regarding EHR’s security requirements define, with some 
fine-grained detail, access control roles and sensitivity levels 
for healthcare professionals to access EHRs [28][29]. 
Moreover, the International Standard ISO/TS 13606-4 states 
some content structure for a specific EHR, for instance, what 
parts it can integrate, how information can be organized and 
what roles can access that information. Such directives and 
indications are taken into account within the proposed 
PACVIM. 
Access control models and practices: PACVIM implements 
concepts already defined within the Patient’s Access Model 
(PAM) in [30]. PAM is built upon the standard RBAC (Role-
Based Access Control) and integrates other characteristics 
such as: break-the-glass (BTG), where there is the possibility 
to change temporarily the access control policy in a controlled 
manner, for instance, in emergency or unanticipated situations 
(an example of  how BTG can be used in a record is shown in 
Fig. 6); and temporal constraints. Temporal constraints are 
added to roles in order to limit the timeframe of access control 
permissions, for example, to healthcare professionals that 
work on shifts. Moreover, in order to provide 
contextualization for these added features, PACVIM will 
include the purpose of use that, in relation to permitting 
constraints, provides context to define the most adequate 
access control rules for requesting information resources. 
Examples of purpose of use can be: emergency accesses, 
asking for a second opinion, research usage and so on [31]. 
Usability: to achieve a user-friendly and captivating 
application for the patients, PACVIM will have a user 
interface where patients can monitor data, roles, people, 
healthcare institutions and their relations over time, simply by 
looking at the screen. Moreover, where possible, PACVIM 
should be operable by touch-screen gestures, giving feelings 
and feedbacks similar to those of a simple game. Such 
interactional features are already offered by most used and 
widespread mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets), 
which nowadays promote very successfully, and on a daily 
basis, this type of visual usage.  
In short, PACVIM must include characteristics reminding 
human-centric, visual and context-aware access control 
systems. Besides, it should be centred on to be usable by the 
patients, commonly less familiar with EHR technology than 
the medical staff and healthcare professionals.  
B. Design Features 
PACVIM’s access control visual model represents 
pictorially healthcare institutions, medical records and/or their 
parts. It shows where those elements are located and which 
roles are allowed to access them. PACVIM adopts visual 
tools, such as the Transparent Enhancing Tools (TETs) [32], 
to generate a network that graphically shows privacy policies 
and data rights, as well as the extent of disclosure of personal 
data to third parties. TETs give better understanding of both 
trust and security that are involved in its design and are 
therefore able to provide, not only more user-friendliness, but 
also a stronger access control usable security. 
An example of an access control network is drawn in Fig. 
5. Each node is an instance of a patient’s medical record 
accessible to the patient, regardless where the record is 
physically located and stored. Usually records are available at 
specific sites, for example hospitals, laboratories, and 
pharmacies, which in Fig. 5 are represented by icons. Inside 
the rectangles are the various compositions of the records that 
are available and/or shared to the healthcare professionals who 
work at that specific institution. This “sharing” relation is 
represented with a straight full line. One or more compositions 
can be shared among several institutions.  
This compact representation gives patients an immediate 
overview of the EHR’s direct, indirect and external 
connections, as well as delegations. Direct connections are 
those that in Fig. 5 lay within the inner circle. They show the 
patient records accessible by the healthcare institutions where 
the patient has registered to access his/her EHR. Indirect 
connections are those lying within the outer circle. This 
usually indicates that a composition has been generated by 
another healthcare institution, following a request made by the 
directly connected institution. For example, the main 
institution, say a hospital, may request a laboratory exam that 
cannot be performed at site; the results of that exam, despite 
generated at the laboratory, need also to be available to the 
hospital that requested it. External connections are the ones 
laying outside the bigger circle in Fig. 5, and are initiated from 
any indirect connection. These are usually located three or 
more links from the patient. Delegations, in Fig. 5 drawn by 
dotted lines, show the entities that have been temporarily 
allowed to access a record, with the patient’s consent.  Section 
V discusses delegation in more detail. A logging/monitoring 
feature will also be available to check role, time and date of 
last accesses to a composition. 
PACVIM’s access control visual model assumes that users 
have touch-screen devices. Thanks to this technology, patients 
can select different monitoring and searching functionalities of 
the parts comprising the EHR by applying hand gestures. 
Patients need only to touch the respective node or rectangle to 
zoom in/out and access any content they want. The graph is 
normally centred on the patient’s record - in Fig. 5 that is the 
human icon from where all the connections start - but patients 
can re-centre the network according to his/her needs or taste, 
by dragging nodes around. 
Fig. 6 shows an example of the content of three different 
compositions of an EHR when a patient magnifies a rectangle 
in the network. These are chronologically ordered. Colours are 
purely indicative here and just help to represent different 
compositions and facilitate the identification of the same 





Fig. 5 - PACVIM: visual access control network of a patient’s EHR. A dotted line represents a delegation between two 







Fig. 6 - Example of an EHR’s content with three 






Fig. 7 - View of the Asthma - ID1 composition over the 






               
 
Fig. 8 - Different views of the Asthma Composition - ID1, at two healthcare institutions (e.g. Analysis Laboratory 2 (left) 
and Hospital 1 (right)). 
 
A composition may include information regarding: (a) the 
clinical episode (clinical content is not shown here); (b) which 
roles – corresponding to types of healthcare professionals and 
associated permissions - can access a composition (e.g., the 
patient as subject of care; the patient’s GP as Personal HP; as 
defined in [28]); (c) exceptions to those roles, which can be 
applied directly to a role or a specific user (e.g., a role or a 
user from a group of professionals can perform Break-the-
glass on a composition); (d) sensitivity levels and any other 
information that may be relevant to both patients and 
healthcare professionals. The sensitivity level of a 
composition, expresses which groups of roles can access it and 
these can be set by default depending on the type of episode, 
specialty and healthcare professional creating that 
composition. It can also be customized later by that same 
healthcare professional or perhaps another with, at least, the 
same access control permissions. The higher the sensitivity 
level, the more sensitive is the information and only more 
privileged and restricted roles can access it.  
Healthcare professionals can be allowed to have their 
private EHR‘s compositions. These pieces of information can 
be directly or indirectly related to the patient, but should be 
accessed only by its owner, i.e., the professional who created 
them. In Fig. 5, a lock ( ) indicates the presence of private 
compositions and in this example, the patient can see a locked 
composition, where it was created, and by whom, but cannot 
access its content. 
PACVIM permits different views. For instance, if the 
patient only wants to view the Asthma – ID1 composition of 
his/her EHR (Fig. 7), these would be highlighted over the 
other components, showing a subset of the full graph. The 
same composition could have different contents and access 
roles depending on the healthcare institution where it is 
available or shared. Fig. 8 shows two views and content of the 
same composition (in this case the Asthma composition ID 1) 
in two different healthcare institutions. Although the 
sensitivity level is the same, the roles for each institution are 
different and therefore, relate to also different access control 
permissions and composition’s content. In the example shown 
for asthma consultation, the information needed in an analysis 
laboratory to perform the required exams, is not the same as in 
a hospital where the healthcare professional accesses these 
exams and, together with other patient information, has to 
perform a more accurate diagnostic. 
All colors and graphics presented here are just for reference 
and will most likely change/evolve as research studies with 
patients and healthcare professionals will provide more 
adequate visual, usability and security requirements. 
V. DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK 
To implement PACVIM is challenging because of the 
socio-technical nature of the healthcare domain and the non-
expertise of patients who are going to use it. PACVIM must 
provide socio-technical security, because even if security 
mechanisms may be proven robust they may still rely on 
users’ decisions and the context where they are set, to reliably 
work. Further, all this needs to be applied without 
compromising usability.  
Such issues need to be addressed accordingly. This section 
discusses the visionary design proposed so far, and present 
what needs to be done so that it can be realized and used by 
the patients, on a daily basis. 
Concerning its visualization features, PACVIM offers 
patients a visual way to access and browse their EHR. The 
authors believe that the proposed graphical interface is simple, 
because it is inspired by state-of-the-art user-friendly 
strategies like Transparent Enhancing Tools. Of course this 
claim should be validated by experiments with real users. 
When running on interactive mobile devices, PACVIM offers 
patients gestures to interact with the EHR. This feature should 
appear familiar to the majority of patients which are 
accustomed to carry on several everyday interactive activities 
such as browsing, playing and shopping, in touch screen 
devices. 
Concerning security, PACVIM comprises access control 
policies and enforces the necessary security mechanisms since 
it integrates with a secure and transparent infrastructure (i.e., 
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OFELIA) that is located within a healthcare institution’s 
security perimeter and policies. In general, OFELIA’s 
technical security has been tested elsewhere [16], but it is 
necessary to evaluate how its integration in PACVIM is going 
to be reliable and robust when PACVIM is used daily by non-
experts. The authors intend to apply techniques of socio-
technical analysis, such as those proposed in [15], to estimate 
PACVIM’s usable security. 
Regarding registration and authentication/authorisation, 
PACVIM uses QR codes. It has been proved that the use of 
QR codes for accessing resources is efficient, easy to 
understand and secure (at least from certain types of attacks, 
like shoulder surfing) [16][26]. Surely, the patient’s device 
and the EHR server can exchange information without the 
patient’s manually entering complex data strings. However, to 
be able to register, patients need to be instructed about the 
process and be physically present at each health institution 
hosting the EHR whose access is being requested. This could 
discourage some patients. However, registration is requested 
only once and after patients have registered, they can take 
advantage of the PACVIM’s interface and have a seamless 
and transparent visual access to all the medical records. 
Patients should have Internet connectivity, which they 
commonly have, and use their preferred browser to 
authenticate, connect and browse the EHR shown on the 
PACVIM’s visual interface. 
Preliminary studies indicate that patients understand 
registration and authentication implemented in this way, but 
there is the need to test it further and in real health scenarios 
with a bigger and more diversified sample of patients. 
Qualitative and quantitative studies need to be performed in 
order to define what types of visualization are adequate to the 
different communities of patients, together with their main 
goals regarding healthcare diagnosis and treatments. These 
studies can also be applied to devise what is the most useful 
and required information inside an EHR composition. The 
composition’s content is compliant with current ISO 
directives, but this needs also to be defined by both patients 
and healthcare professionals. Moreover, a definition of the 
different views for each type of end-users’ community, goals 
and characteristics, is still required to make PACVIM usable 
widely. For instance, as already mentioned, healthcare 
professionals could prefer creating private compositions, 
inaccessible to patients. Such features, if required, raise further 
questions: should locked compositions be visible to patients or 
should they be completely transparent to them? Such 
interrogatives can also be answered within the preliminary 
studies and experiments to design and implement PACVIM. 
At present, the proposed PACVIM design gives patients 
read-only access. But there is already a scenario, delegation, 
where would be reasonable to let patients intervene and decide 
upon who can access their EHR. In fact, delegation is granting 
temporary access permissions to subjects outside the defined 
access control policy network. It would not be difficult to 
extend the current design to realize this feature: healthcare 
professionals would have to invoice a delegation request to the 
patient’s mobile device using OFELIA. After the patient 
successfully identifies and authenticates those professionals, 
s/he can decide to allow that request or designate a responsible 
to handle it, likely a trustee acting on the patient’s behalf. 
PACVIM sets up a delegation connection by attributing a 
temporary role to the healthcare professional that needs to 
access his/her composition(s). The status of the delegation can 
be monitored and audited at any time: delegations appear as 
dotted lines in the EHR network (Fig. 5).  
Other future work is about including advanced features in 
PACVIM. The first is allowing compositions for alternative 
medical encounters or patients’ notes – e.g., acupuncture, 
physiotherapy or even a patient’s health diary. A second 
feature is to add advanced search tools able to index with fine-
grained detail the pieces of information contained within the 
compositions. Searching may be a must, when an EHR 
network becomes too big to be represented in one screenshot, 
or when it has too many healthcare institutions that share a 
patient’s EHR and turns out to be highly confusing. There may 
be the need to adapt different views according to this and other 
factors. A third and last feature is about permitting to 
edit/change roles. A patient’s control could be extended with 
the right to manage roles attributed to the healthcare 
professionals in healthcare institutions, of course in limited, 
well-defined situations. For example, access can be granted to 
substitute general practitioners or, for example, to allow 
doctors that happen to be around and help the patient in some 
urgent, first-aid situation [33]. 
To conclude this discussion, is important to mention the 
current status of EHR implementations. Although some of 
those databases are up and running, there is little or no 
standard solutions to integrate the EHRs from different 
healthcare institutions. Data integration in healthcare is still a 
very big and unresolved challenge. The overall technical 
security, workflow and access policies enforced by those 
institutions are likely bound to be different. The various 
systems are probably running on different infrastructures, and 
are implemented from different designs. A step towards this 
integration is to have an OFELIA web service acting as an 
integrator layer and running in every EHR. There are plans to 
test OFELIA in two different healthcare institutions but this is 
a long term future work for it involves coping with different 
administrations, regulations and other constraints. However, 
this does not impede to build a PACVIM prototype, and test it, 
at first within one hospital where different EHR compositions 
are created and shared within various medical departments. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents and discusses a preliminary design of 
PACVIM, an access control visual application that allows 
patients to access their EHR. No such application is available 
yet. The proposed visionary design addresses socio-technical 
security and usability features, but further research studies are 
needed to put into practice the vision presented in this paper. 
These include: (a) a survey applied to patients and healthcare 
professionals to know more about their opinions regarding 
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PACVIM, its possible uses and expectations; (b) designing 
and building a PACVIM prototype, which integrates the 
results obtained in (a); and (c) applying this prototype in one 
or various healthcare practices to learn more in terms of its 
security and usability aspects, in order to enhance PACVIM.  
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